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Abstract. In this paper, we prove an important cryptographic property
of PE-transformation proposed elsewhere. If PE-transformation is used as
encrypting function then after n applications of it on arbitrary message the
distribution of l-tuples (l = 1, 2, . . . , n) is uniform. This property implies the
resistance of statistical kind of attack of this transformation. For illustration
of theoretical results, some experimental results are presented as well.
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1 Introduction
Quasigroups and quasigroup transformations are very useful for construction of
cryptographic primitives, error detecting and error correcting codes. The reasons
for that are the structure of quasigroups, their large number, the properties of
quasigroup transformations and so on. The quasigroup string transformations E
and their properties were considered in several papers.
A quasigroup (Q, ∗) is a groupoid (i.e. algebra with one binary operation ∗ on
the finite set Q) satisfying the law:
(∀u, v ∈ Q)(∃!x, y ∈ Q) (x ∗ u = v & u ∗ y = v) (1)
In fact, (1) says that a groupoid (Q, ∗) is a quasigroup if and only if the equations
x ∗ u = v and u ∗ y = v have unique solutions x and y for each given u, v ∈ Q.
In the sequel, let A = {1, . . . , a} be an alphabet of integers (a ≥ 2) and denote
by A+ = {x1 . . . xk| xi ∈ A, k ≥ 1} the set of all finite strings over A. Note that
A+ =
⋃
k≥1
Ak, where Ak = {x1 . . . xk| xi ∈ A}. Assuming that (A, ∗) is a given
quasigroup, for any letter l ∈ A (called leader), Markovski and al. (see [5]) defined
the transformation E = E
(1)
l : A
+ → A+ by
E(x1 . . . xk) = y1 . . . yk ⇔
{
y1 = l ∗ x1,
yi = yi−1 ∗ xi, i = 2, . . . , k
(2)
where xi, yi ∈ A. Then, for given quasigroup operations ∗1, ∗2, . . . , ∗n on the set A,
we can define mappings E1, E2, . . . , En, in the same manner as previous by choosing
fixed elements l1, l2, . . . , ln ∈ A (such that Ei is corresponding to ∗i and li). Let
E(n) = E
(n)
ln,...,l1
= En ◦ En−1 ◦ . . . ◦ E1,
where ◦ is the usual composition of mappings (n ≥ 1). It is easy to check that the
mappings E is a bijection. In the same paper, authors proposed a transformation
E(n) as an encryption function and proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let α ∈ A+ be an arbitrary string and β = E(n)(α). Then m-tuples
in β are uniformly distributed for m ≤ n.
Also, in Theorem 2 in [1], Bakeva and Dimitrova proved that the probabili-
ties of (n + 1)-tuples in β = E(n)(α) are divided in a classes where a = |A|, if
(p1, p2, . . . , pa) is the distribution of letters in an input string and p1, p2, . . . , pa are
distinct probabilities, i.e., pi 6= pj for i 6= j. Each class contains a
n elements with
the same probabilities and the probability of each (n+1)-tuple in i-th class is
1
an
pi,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , a. If pi1 = pi2 = . . . = piν for some 1 ≤ i1 < . . . < iν ≤ a, then
the classes with probabilities
1
an
pi1 =
1
an
pi2 = . . . =
1
an
piν will be merged in one
class with νan elements. Using these results, the authors proposed an algorithm for
cryptanalysis.
In paper [4], Krapez gave an idea for a new quasigroup string transformation
based on parastrophes of quasigroups. A modification of this quasigroup transfor-
mation is defined in [2]. In [3], authors showed that the parastrophic quasigroup
transformation has good properties for application in cryptography. Namely, using
that transformation the number of quasigroups of order 4 useful in cryptography
is increased. To complete the proof of goodness of parastrophic quasigroup trans-
formation for cryptography, it is needed to prove that Theorem 1 holds for that
transformation, too. It will guarantee that message encrypted by the parastrophic
quasigroup transformation will be resistant of a statistical kind of attacks.
2 Parastrophic transformation
In this Section, we briefly repeat the construction of parastrophic quasigroup trans-
formation given in [2].
Recall that every quasigroup (Q, ∗) has a set of five quasigroups, called paras-
trophes denoted with /, \, ·, //, \\ which are defined in Table 1.
Table 1. Parastrophes of quasigroup operations ∗
Parastrophe operations
x\y = z ⇐⇒ x ∗ z = y
x/y = z ⇐⇒ z ∗ y = x
x · y = z ⇐⇒ y ∗ x = z
x//y = z ⇐⇒ y/x = z ⇐⇒ z ∗ x = y
x\\y = z ⇐⇒ y\x = z ⇐⇒ y ∗ z = x
In this paper we use the following notations for parastrophe operations:
f1(x, y) = x ∗ y, f2(x, y) = x\y, f3(x, y) = x/y,
f4(x, y) = x · y, f5(x, y) = x//y, f6(x, y) = x\\y.
Let M = x1x2 . . . xk be an input message. Let d1 be an random integer such
that (2 ≤ d1 < k) and l be random chosen element (leader) from A. Also, let (A, ∗)
be a quasigroup and f1, . . . , f6 be its parastrophe operations.
Using previous transformationE, for chosen l, d1 and quasigroup (A, ∗) we define
a parastrophic transformation PE = PEl,d1 : A
+ → A+ as follows.
At first, let q1 = d1 be the length of the first block, i.e., M1 = x1x2 . . . xq1 . Let
s1 = (d1 mod 6) + 1. Applying the transformation E on the block M1 with leader
l and quasigroup operation fs1 , we obtain the encrypted block
C1 = y1y2 . . . yq1−1yq1 = Efs1 ,l(x1x2 . . . xq1−1xq1).
Further on, using last two symbols in C1 we calculate the number d2 = 4yq1−1+yq1
which determines the length of the next block. Let q2 = q1+d2, s2 = (d2 mod 6)+1
and M2 = xq1+1 . . . xq2−1xq2 . After applying Efs2 ,yq1 , the encrypted block C2 is
C2 = yq1+1 . . . yq2−1yq2 = Efs2 ,yq1 (xq1+1 . . . xq2−1xq2).
In general case, for given i, let the encrypted blocks C1,. . . , Ci−1 be obtained
and di be calculated using the last two symbols in Ci−1, i.e., di = 4yqi−1 + yqi . Let
qi = qi−1 + di, si = (di mod 6) + 1 and Mi = xqi−1+1 . . . xqi−1xqi . We apply the
transformation Efsi ,yqi−1 on the block Mi and obtain the encrypted block
Ci = Efsi ,yqi−1 (xqi−1+1 . . . xqi ).
Now, the parastrophic transformation is defined as
PEl,d1(M) = PEl,d1(x1x2 . . . xn) = C1||C2|| . . . ||Cr, (3)
where || is a concatenation of blocks. Note that the length of the last block Mr may
be shorter than dr (depends on the number of letters in the input message). The
transformation PE is schematically presented in Figure 1.
For arbitrary quasigroup on a set A, random leaders l1, . . . ln and random lengths
d
(1)
1 , . . . , d
(n)
1 , we define mappings PE1, PE2, . . . , PEn as in (3) such that PEi is
corresponding to d
(i)
1 and li. Using them, we define the transformation PE
(n) as
follows:
PE(n) = PE
(n)
(ln,d
(n)
1 ),...,(l1,d
(1)
1 )
= PEn ◦ PEn−1 ◦ . . . ◦ PE1,
where ◦ is the usual composition of mappings.
3 Theoretical proof for resistance of statistical kind of
attacks
Let the alphabet A be as above. A randomly chosen element of the set Ak can
be considered as a random vector (X1, X2, . . . , Xk), where A is the range of Xi,
i = 1, . . . , k. We consider these vectors as input messages. The transformation
PE = PEl,d1 : A
+ → A+ can be defined as:
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Fig. 1. Parastrophic transformation PE
PEl,d1(X1, . . . , Xk) = (Y1, . . . , Yk)⇔
⇔


Y1 = fs1(l,X1), Yj = fs1(Yj−1, Xj), j = 2, . . . , d1,
Yqi+j = fsi+1(Yqi+j−1, Xqi+j), i = 1, . . . , r − 1, j = 1, . . . , di+1
(4)
Let (p1, p2, ..., pa) be the probability distribution of the letters 1, ..., a in an input
message. That implies pi > 0 for each i = 1, 2, ..., a and
a∑
i=1
pi = 1.
An important property of one transformation for application in cryptography is
the uniform distribution of the substrings in the output message (Y1, . . . , Yk). This
property guarantee the resistance of statistical attack. Therefore, we investigate the
distribution of substrings in the output message obtained using PE-transformation.
At first we will prove that after applying the transformation PE(1) on an input
message α, the letters in transformed message are uniformly distributed.
Theorem 2. The letter Yt has uniform distribution on the set A = {1, . . . , a}, i.e.,
Yt ∼ U({1, . . . , a}) for each t (t = 1, 2, . . . , k).
Proof. In this proof we use the same notations as in construction of parastrophic
quasigroup transformation given in the previous section.
At first, note that the leader l can be consider as uniformly distributed random
variables on the set A since it is randomly chosen from the set A. Therefore, l ∼
U({1, . . . , a}), i.e.,
P{l = i} =
1
a
, for each i ∈ A.
Also, leader l is independent of each letter Xi in the input message.
Let t = 1. Using the equation (4) and total probability theorem, for distribution
of Y1, we obtain
P{Y1 = j} = P{fs1(l, X1) = j}
=
a∑
i=1
P{l = i}P{fs1(l, X1) = j|l = i}
=
a∑
i=1
1
a
P{fs1(l, X1) = j|l = i}
=
a∑
i=1
1
a
P{fs1(i,X1) = j}
=
1
a
a∑
i=1
P{X1 = f
′
s1
(i, j)}
Here, f ′s1 is the inverse quasigroup transformation of fs1 , i.e. if fs1(u, x) = v, then
f ′s1(u, v) = x. Note that if i runs over all values of A then for fixed j, the expression
X1 = f
′
s1
(i, j) runs over all values of A, too. Therefore,
P{Y1 = j} =
1
a
a∑
i=1
P{X1 = f
′
s1
(i, j)} =
1
a
a∑
i=1
pi =
1
a
,
i.e., Y1 ∼ U({1, . . . , a}).
We proceed by induction, and let suppose that Yr ∼ U({1, 2, . . . , a}). Similarly
as previous, using that fsr+1 is the parastrophe operation applied in (r + 1)
th step
we compute the distribution of Yr+1 as follows.
P{Yr+1 = j} = P{fsr+1(Yr, Xr+1) = j}
=
a∑
i=1
P{Yr = i}P{fsr+1(Yr, Xr+1) = j|Yr = i}
=
a∑
i=1
1
a
P{fsr+1(i,Xr+1) = j|Yr = i}
According to definition of parastrophic operation given with (4), we can conclude
that the random variables Xr+1 and Yr are independent. Applying that in previous
equation, we obtain
P{Yr+1 = j} =
a∑
i=1
1
a
P{fsr+1(i,Xr+1) = j}
=
1
a
a∑
i=1
P{Xr+1 = f
′
sr+1
(i, j)}
=
1
a
.
As previous, f ′sr+1 is the inverse quasigroup transformation of fsr+1 . In the last
equation, we use that Xr+1 = f
′
sr+1
(i, j) runs over all values of A when j is fixed
and i runs over all values of A, i.e.
a∑
i=1
P{Xr+1 = f
′
sr+1
(i, j)} =
a∑
i=1
pi = 1.
On this way, we proved that Yt has uniform distribution on the set A, for each t ≥ 1.
From the Theorem 2 we can conclude the follows. IfM ∈ Ak and C = PEl,d1(M)
then the letters in the message C are uniformly distributed, i.e., the probability of
the appearance of a letter i at the arbitrary place of the string C is
1
a
, for each
i ∈ A.
Theorem 3. Let M ∈ A+ be an arbitrary string and C = PE(n)(M). Then the
m-tuples in C are uniformly distributed for m ≤ n.
Proof. Let (Y
(n)
1 , Y
(n)
2 , . . . , Y
(n)
k ) = PE
(n)(X1, X2, . . . , Xk). We will prove this the-
orem by induction. Let suppose that the statement is satisfied for n = r, i.e.,
(Y
(r)
t+1, Y
(r)
t+2 . . . Y
(r)
t+l ) ∼ U({1, 2, . . . , a}
l) for each 1 ≤ l ≤ r and each t ≥ 0. Now,
let n = r + 1. We consider the distribution of (Y
(r+1)
t+1 , Y
(r+1)
t+2 . . . Y
(r+1)
t+l ) for each
1 ≤ l ≤ r + 1 and arbitrary t.
P{Y
(r+1)
t+1 = y
(r+1)
t+1 , Y
(r+1)
t+2 = y
(r+1)
t+2 , . . . , Y
(r+1)
t+l = y
(r+1)
t+l }
= P{Y
(r+1)
t+1 = y
(r+1)
t+1 , fst+2(Y
(r+1)
t+1 , Y
(r)
t+2) = y
(r+1)
t+2 , . . .
. . . , fst+l(Y
(r+1)
t+l−1 , Y
(r)
t+l ) = y
(r+1)
t+l },
where fsj is the parastrophe operation applied in the step j and f
′
sj
is its inverse
transformation, j = t+ 2, . . . , t+ l. Now,
P{Y
(r+1)
t+1 = y
(r+1)
t+1 , Y
(r+1)
t+2 = y
(r+1)
t+2 , . . . , Y
(r+1)
t+l = y
(r+1)
t+l }
= P{Y
(r+1)
t+1 = y
(r+1)
t+1 , fst+2(y
(r+1)
t+1 , Y
(r)
t+2) = y
(r+1)
t+2 , . . .
. . . , fst+l(y
(r+1)
t+l−1, Y
(r)
t+l ) = y
(r+1)
t+l }
= P{Y
(r+1)
t+1 = y
(r+1)
t+1 , Y
(r)
t+2 = f
′
st+2
(y
(r+1)
t+1 , y
(r+1)
t+2 ), . . .
. . . , Y
(r)
t+l = f
′
st+l
(y
(r+1)
t+l−1, y
(r+1)
t+l )}
= P{Y
(r+1)
t+1 = y
(r+1)
t+1 }P{Y
(r)
t+2 = f
′
st+2
(y
(r+1)
t+1 , y
(r+1)
t+2 ), . . .
. . . , Y
(r)
t+l = f
′
st+l
(y
(r+1)
t+l−1, y
(r+1)
t+l )}.
The last equality is obtained by using the fact that Y
(r+1)
t+1 is independent of the
vector (Y
(r)
t+2, . . . , Y
(r)
t+l ), since Y
(r)
t+2, . . . , Y
(r)
t+l are not used for obtaining Y
(r+1)
t+1 .
Using the inductive hypothesis (Y
(r)
t+2, . . . , Y
(r)
t+l ) ∼ U({1, 2, . . . , a}
l−1), Y
(r+1)
t+1 ∼
U({1, 2, . . . , a}) and from previous expression we obtain that
P{Y
(r+1)
t+1 = y
(r+1)
t+1 , Y
(r+1)
t+2 = y
(r+1)
t+2 , . . . , Y
(r+1)
t+l = y
(r+1)
t+l } =
1
a
·
1
al−1
=
1
al
.
So, we have proved that (Y
(n)
t+1 , Y
(n)
t+2 . . . Y
(n)
t+l ) ∼ U({1, 2, . . . , a}
l) for each l ≤ n
and each t ≥ 0.
4 Experimental results
We made many experiments in order to present our theoretical results. Here we give
an example. We have randomly chosen a message M with 1,000,000 letters of the
alphabet A = {1, 2, 3, 4} with the distribution of letters given in the Table 2 .
Table 2. The distribution of the letters in the input message
1 2 3 4
0.70 0.15 0.10 0.05
We used the quasigroup (5) and its parastrophes.
∗ 1 2 3 4
1 1 2 4 3
2 3 4 2 1
3 4 3 1 2
4 2 1 3 4
(5)
After applying PE(3) on M , we got a encrypted message C = PE(3)(M). In
each PE-transformation, we chose the length of the first block d1 = 3 and the
initial leader l1 = 4.
The distribution of letters in the output C is given in the Table 3.
Table 3. The distribution of the letters in the output message
1 2 3 4
0.2501 0.2393 0.2576 0.2530
It is obvious that the distribution of letters in the output message C is uniform.
The distribution of pairs, triplets and 4-tuples of letters in C are given on the
Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4. On the Figure 2, the pairs are presented on the
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
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0.3
0.4
0.5
input output
Fig. 2. The distribution of the pairs in the input message and the output message
10 20 30 40 50 60
0.05
0.1
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input output
Fig. 3. The distribution of the triplets in the input message and the output message
50 100 150 200 250
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input output
Fig. 4. The distribution of the 4-tuples in the input message and the output message
x-axis in the lexicographic order (′11′ → 1, ′12′ → 2, . . . , ′44′ → 16). On the similar
way, the triplets and 4-tuples are presented on Figure 3 and Figure 4.
We can see on Figure 2 and Figure 3 that after three applications of PE-
transformations, the pairs and triplets are also uniformly distributed as we proved
in Theorem 3. Also, we can see on Figure 4 that the distribution of the 4-tuples in
C is not uniform, but that distribution is closer to the uniform distribution than
the distribution of 4-tuples in the input message.
Next, we check whether Theorem 2 in [1] is satisfied when PE-transformation
is applied. The distribution of pairs after one application of PE-transformation
is presented on Figure 5 a). On Figure 5 b), we present the distribution of pairs
after one application of E-transformation. We can see that probabilities of pairs
are divided in 4 classes on Figure 5 b) as the Theorem 2 in [1] claims. But we
cannot distinguish any classes for probabilities on Figure 5 a). This means that the
algorithm for cryptanalysis proposed in [1] cannot be applied when an input message
is encrypted by PE-transformation. Therefore encryption by PE-transformation is
more resistant on statistical kind of attacks.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0.025
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0.075
0.1
0.125
0.15
0.175
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0.025
0.05
0.075
0.1
0.125
0.15
0.175
a) b)
Fig. 5. The distributions of the pairs in output messages obtained by PE- and E-
transformation
Note that for relevant statistical analyses, we must have enough large input
message. Namely, in experiments, the probabilities of n-tuples are computed as
relative frequencies. So, a relative frequency of an event tends to probability only if
we have enough large sample. The relevant statistical analyses cannot be done for
shorter message. Therefore, statistical kind of attack is impossible on not enough
large input message. Note that if an intruder catches and concatenates a lot of
short messages encrypted by the same PE(n)-transformation, it will obtain a long
message and it can apply a statistical attack. But, the attack will be impossible if
we change quasigroups used in encryption PE(n)-transformation more often.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we proved that after n applications of PE-transformation on an ar-
bitrary message the distribution of l-tuples (l = 1, . . . , n) is uniform and we cannot
distinguish classes of probabilities in the distribution of (n+ 1)-tuples. This means
that if PE-transformation is used as encryption function the obtained cipher mes-
sages are resistant on statistical kind of attacks when the number n of applications
of PE-transformation is enough large.
In [5], the authors concluded that E-transformation can be applied in cryptog-
raphy as encryption function since the number of quasigroups is huge one (there
are more than 1058000 quasigroups when |A| = 256) and the brute force attack is
not reasonable.
If PE-transformation is used in encryption algorithm then the secret key will
be a triplet (∗, l, d1). In that case, the brute force attack also is not possible since
except the quasigroup operation ∗ and leader l, the key contains the length of the
first block d1 which has influence of the dynamic of changing of parastrophes.
At the end, in [3] authors proved that PE-transformation has better crypto-
graphic properties than E-transformation for quasigroups of order 4. Namely, some
of fractal quasigroups of order 4 become parastrophic non-fractal and they can
be used for designing of cryptographic primitives. Investigation for quasigroups of
larger order cannot be done in real time since their number is very large.
Finally, from all results we can conclude that PE-transformation is better as
encrypting function than E-transformation.
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